

**1. Friday, February 22, 2019 - 3:00pm, BEH 217**

**"Natural Artificiality: A Contested Pattern in Human Evolution."**

**Phillip Honenberger, Department of Philosophy, University of Las Vegas**

In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, a number of theorists proposed a particular pattern of relation between biological and cultural factors in human life: namely, that while capacity for culture is a selected-for or species-typical feature of human beings, the content of that culture is not equivalently selected-for or species-typical. This pattern poses interesting questions for evolutionary theory and theories of behavior, and (to the extent it applies) may have implications for epistemology, ethics, and social theory. My aim in this talk is to clarify how such a structure i

**3. Friday, March 29, 2019 - 3:00pm, BEH 217**

**"The Social Epistemology of Maps."**

**Quill Kukla, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown University**

A burgeoning branch of philosophy of science attends to the material and social production of scientific knowledge, and examines how interests are often embedded inextricably in scientific standards and methods. Cartography and geographic information science have not received this kind of analysis. To the extent that philosophers talk about maps, they generally discuss abstract visual

**7. Friday, May 10, 2019 - 3:00pm, BEH 217**

**"E  $\nrightarrow$  N"**

**Chris, Tillman and Adam Murray, Department of Philosophy, University of Manitoba**

This talk is based on work done with Joshua Spencer of UW-Milwaukee. What is the relationship between essence and necessity? A popular thought was that they amount to the same thing, or are, at least, materially equivalent. But Kit Fine (1994) convinced many that this isn't so; there can be necessary facts pertaining to you (e.g., you're a member of your singleton), that aren't correspondingly essence facts (supposing your essence is silent on whether there are sets). In slogan form, we can think of Fine as arguing for  $N \nrightarrow E$ .

We want to argue that the relationship between essence and necessity is even more complicated: we argue for  $E \nrightarrow N$ . That is, there can be essence facts pertaining to a thing that aren't correspondingly necessary facts. Some  $x$  can figure into the essence of  $y$ , but without it being the case that, necessarily,  $y$  exists only if  $x$  does. We consider a range of metaphysical views that we see as committed to  $E \nrightarrow N$ . But the bigger point, for us, is that  $E \nrightarrow N$  should be endorsed regardless of your stance on those metaphysical views. For an account of essence should not decide seemingly independent and substantive metaphysical debates by fiat.

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